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On Bayes-Nash implementation of combinatorial auctions: structure and efficiency

Hajek, B (Illinois)
Wednesday 17 March 2010, 15:00-17:00

Meeting Room 3, CMS


In the first hour of this two-part presentation, an overview of combinatorial auction theory is given, including its use in spectrum auctions. Also included is an overview of the structure of Bayesian optimal auctions, along the lines of Myerson, but for discrete-valued valuations. A novel graphical construction of virtual valuations is provided. In the second part of the presentation, the problem of characterising revenue optimal auctions for single-minded buyers is discussed, meaning each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle of items and has a value for the same, and both the choice of bundle and the value are private information. The talk will also address the question of how efficient the revenue optimal auction is. (Based on joint work with Vineet Abhishek).


[pdf ]

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